

TITLE OF THE INVENTION

CODE GENERATING METHOD AND UNIT THEREOF, CODE DETECTING
METHOD AND UNIT THEREOF, AND WATERMARK EMBEDDING UNIT
AND WATERMARK DETECTING UNIT

5 CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

This application is based upon and claims the
benefit of priority from the prior Japanese Patent
Applications No. 11-280652, filed September 30, 1999;
No. 2000-016285, filed January 25, 2000; and
10 No. 2000-263872, filed August 31, 2000, the entire
contents of which are incorporated herein by reference.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to an electronic
watermark unit for embedding watermark information in
15 contents such as audio, music, motion pictures, still
images, and the like which are digitized as data, and
an electronic watermark detection unit for detecting
watermark information from contents having embedded
watermark information.

20 Digital watermarking is a technique as follows.
Information such as identification information
concerning a copyright holder or user of a content,
right information of a copyright holder, conditions
for use of a content, secret information required when
25 using a content, copy control information, and/or
the like (which are called watermark information) is
embedded in contents such as audio, music, motion

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pictures, still images, and the like which are digitized as data, such that the information cannot be easily discovered. By detecting watermark information later from contents if necessary, use of contents is limited or copyright protection is achieved including copy control. Thus, secondary use is promoted by this technique.

[Requirements for Digital Watermarking]

For the purpose of preventing illegal use, the digital watermarking technique must provide a characteristic (robustness) that watermark information is not eliminated or altered by various operations or intentional attacks that are generally supposed to be made on the digital copyrighted material. For example, still images and motion pictures are often subjected to irreversible compression called JPEG (Joint Photographic Coding Experts Group) coding and MPEG (Moving Picture Experts Group) coding, respectively. Therefore, it is an important requirement for the digital watermarking technique to have robustness with respect to irreversible compression of these kinds.

[Classification of Digital Watermarks]

Conventional digital watermarking methods for images can be coarsely classified into a pixel area utilization type and a frequency domain utilization type. In a digital watermarking method of the pixel area utilization type, watermark information

is directly embedded by changing pixel values.
Meanwhile, in a digital watermarking method of the
frequency domain utilization type, a pixel area is
shifted to a frequency domain by orthogonal conversion,
5 and is then embedded in the frequency domain.

Thereafter, the frequency domain is shifted to
the pixel area by reverse orthogonal conversion.

The watermark information is embedded as a wave.

[Frequency domain Utilization Type Digital Watermarking
10 Method]

A digital watermarking method of the frequency
domain utilization type is described in, for example,
reference [1] Cox, I.J., Kilian, J., Leighton, T. and
Shamoon, T., "Secure Spread Spectrum Watermarking for
15 Multimedia", NEC Research Institute, Technical Report
95-10, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as Cox et al.
method). In this method, a frequency component as a
target to be embedded is set within a range from a low
frequency to a middle frequency, in which influences
20 from irreversible compression are small. In this
manner, the robustness is realized with respect to
irreversible compression.

[Digital Watermarking Based on Spread Spectrum]

There is a method of improving the robustness with
25 respect to irreversible compression by adopting the
concept of spread spectrum. The spread spectrum means
a communication method of transferring information

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widely spread within a band sufficiently large than
a band necessary for a signal to be transmitted by
communication (Reference [2]: Yamauchi Yukimichi,
"Spread Spectrum Communication", Tokyo-Denki-Daigaku
5 Shuppankyoku, 1994). This method is excellent in
tolerance to noise on transfer paths. The concept of
spread spectrum is adopted to the digital watermarking
technique by considering an original content as a
carrier wave, watermark information as a desirable
10 wave, and influence from irreversible compression as a
interference wave (noise). Spread within a frequency
domain (see the reference [1]) has been proposed as
a digital watermarking method based on spread spectrum.
[Spread in Frequency Domain (Perturbation Method)]

15 In the method according to the reference [1]
described above, watermark information is embedded
by performing orthogonal conversion on pixel values,
and watermark information is spread and embedded in a
frequency domain. Spreading is carried out by changing
20 a plurality of frequency components in the frequency
domain, in accordance with a random number sequence.
After the spreading, reverse orthogonal conversion
is carried out. To detect watermark information,
orthogonal conversion is performed on pixel values, and
25 a determination is made on correlative values between
values of the frequency components where watermark
information is embedded and the random number

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sequence used for embedding the watermark information. Embedded watermark information is spread throughout the entire image (block) within the pixel area, so the watermark information is robust with respect to various operations. If the frequency components where watermark information is embedded is within a low/middle frequency domain, the watermark information is difficult to eliminate by a low-frequency pass filter. [Fingerprinting]

In the digital watermarking method, consideration has been taken into an application that a user ID (user identification number) is embedded as watermark information in contents so that information specifying a user of the content is embedded. This application is called "fingerprinting" and is expected to restrict redistribution of illegal copies, e.g., pirated editions.

[Problem of Collusion Attack]

However, when there are a plurality of equal contents which respectively have different embedded watermark information items, there can be an act of using the plurality of contents to alter or eliminate the watermark information items. This act is called "collusion attack". For example, in the collusion attack, the pixel values are averaged between the plurality of contents to forge a new content, or a part where pixel values or frequency component values differ

[Conventional Countermeasures against Collusion Attack]

According to the reference [1], a different actual random number sequence according to $N(0, 1)$ is given for every user. It is supposed that no correlation exists between two different actual random number sequences. A collusion attack is taken as an operation which averages pixel values. The correlation value at the time of detection attenuates due to collusion attack.

In the reference [1], a colluder is detected by a defined similarity in place of the correlation value. The similarity is defined as a result of dividing a correlation value by the norm of detected watermark information. Since the norm of watermark information attenuates due to the collusion attack, the similarity does not much attenuates even if the correlation value attenuates. In this manner, all the colluders can be determined. However, this method has a difficulty that it requires an original image as an embedding target and takes a long time to determine colluders.

The reference [3] proposes a method of determining a colluder, which contrastingly uses the characteristic of attenuation of the correlation value due to averaging when a collusion attack occurs. Since a watermark which is common to colluders does not attenuate while other watermarks attenuate, a set of colluders is determined from a set of watermarks which maintains the level at the time of embedding through the collusion attack. Where n is the number of all users and c is a supposed maximum number of colluders, colluders can be determined by an embedded code having a length of $(c+1)(c-1)\log_{c+1}n$ order. However, this method utilizes a characteristic particular to the spread spectrum method, and therefore cannot be applied to all digital watermarking methods.

The above-mentioned reference [4] proposes

a method which utilizes a characteristic that a bit having a value common to all colluders cannot be observed in codes expressing watermark information by colluders. If such an unobservable bit remains unchanged, a code (called a c-frameproof code), which cannot generate a codeword of other users than colluders no matter how the other bits may be changed, is generated as an embedded codeword and is embedded as watermark information in a content.

In this method, there is a possibility that a codeword which does not belong to any person is generated as an embedded codeword. However, if a user redistributes a user's own content (native redistribution), he cannot make a denial saying that the redistribution is based on a collusion attack from another person.

The n-frameproof code which receives no limitation to the total number of colluders has a code length of n . The c-frameproof code in which the total number of colluders is c at most has a code length of $16c^2 \log n$ (where c is the number of colluders and n is the number of all users).

Further, the reference [4] shows the following. That is, there exist no code (totally c-secure code) in which, if there are two groups of colluders and a common part of them is a null set, a common part common to sets of codewords (feasible sets) which can

be generated by a collusion attack in each group is also a null set. That is, the reference shows that there strictly is no code that strictly cannot generate a codeword which does not belong any colluder by a collusion attack.

Hence, in the reference [4], a code (c-secure code with ϵ -error) having a probability of ϵ or less at which an incorrect colluder (an innocent user) is erroneously pointed out in case where the number of colluders is c or less is constructed as an embedded code. At first, a n-secure code $\Gamma(n, 2n^2 \log(2n/\epsilon))$ with ϵ -error is constructed. The code length thereof is $2n^2(n-1)\log(2n/\epsilon)$.

Further, by combining the above code with an idea used in the Traitor Tracing scheme (reference [7]: Chor, B., Fiat, A. and Naor, M., "Tracing traitors", Proceedings of CRYPTO'94, 257-270, 1994), a c-secure code with ϵ -error is constructed. This code has a code length of $O(c^4 \log(n/\epsilon) \log(1/\epsilon))$.

[Chernoff Bound]

In the reference [7], the number of keys particular to users, which is necessary to determine a colluder by using a formula of the Chernoff bound, is determined by the Traitor Tracing scheme. In the reference [4] described previously, this method is appropriately used to construct an n-secure code and a c-secure code with ϵ -error. When there are

independent n probability variables $X_i \in \{0,1\}$ whose average value is p , the Chernoff bound gives bounds on the probability at which the sum of the variables is offset from the average value. The upper and lower bounds are obtained by the following formulas, respectively.

$$\Pr\left[\sum_{i=1}^n X_i - np > n\delta\right] < \{\exp(\delta/p)/(1+\delta/p)^{1+\delta/p}\}^{np}$$

$$\Pr\left[\sum_{i=1}^n X_i - np < -n\delta\right] < \{\exp(-\delta/p)/(1-\delta/p)^{1-\delta/p}\}^{np}$$

Further, the next formula exists as a loose bound.

$$\Pr\left[\left|\sum_{i=1}^n X_i - np\right| > n\delta\right] < 2 \cdot \exp\{-\delta^2 n / (2p(1-p))\}$$

Where $0 \leq \delta < p(1-p)$ exists, the next formula is given then.

$$\Pr\left[\sum_{i=1}^n X_i - np < -n\delta\right] < \exp\{-\delta^2 n / (2p^2)\}$$

[Method for Pointing Out Only Two of Colluders]

The n -secure code and c -secure code with ε -error proposed in the reference [4] are designed so as to point out as many colluders as possible. Considering the users as an ordered set, the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code can be used as a code which specifies two of the uppermost and lowermost in a set of colluders. In this case, the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code can be constructed with a much smaller code length.

The $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code is a code which is constructed by

continuous sequences of 1 and 0, taking d bits as a unit. The d -bit sequences of 1 and 0 are disposed such that the number of units is equal to the number of codewords n minus 1. Accordingly, in this code, 1 and 0 are disposed continuously, taking d bits as a unit for each. A sequence of 1 or 0 smaller than d -bits does not exist isolatedly.

For example, let $d=3$ and $n=5$, $\Gamma_0(5,3)$ code becomes as follows.

10 111 111 111 111
 000 111 111 111
 000 000 111 111
 000 000 000 111
 000 000 000 000

15 The reference [5] proposes an n -secure code in which two codes layered in the ascending order and descending order are used to specify two in a set of colluders. The code length of this code is $2n \log_4(2/\epsilon) = n \log_2(2/\epsilon)$. The reference [6] shows a similar method as follows. That is, the minimum $S(S_{\min})$ which satisfies $0 < \text{weight}(x|_{B_S})$ and the maximum $S(S_{\max})$ which satisfies $\text{weight}(x|_{B_S}) < d$ are obtained by the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code. Two of colluders are specified by an algorithm which points out that S_{\min} and $S_{\max}+1$ are colluders. In case of this code, the n -secure code with ϵ -error has a code length of $(n-1)\log_2(2/\epsilon)$.
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[2-secure Code with ϵ -error]

If the total number of colluders is small, the code length of the embedded code can be small. The reference [6] described above shows a code which points out both of colluders where the total colluders is two and which has a code length of $(3n^{1/2}-1) \log_2(6/\epsilon)$.

[Limit of Collusion-Resistance]

A reference [9] (Ergun, Funde, Joe Kilian and Ravi Kumar, "A Note on the Limits of Collusion Resistant Watermarking", EUROCRYPT'99, 140-149, 1999) theoretically shows that a limit of resistance to collusion attacks exists without depending on details of digital watermarking methods. Their conclusion says that a try to raise the probability of pointing out correct colluders leads to an increase of the probability (false positive rate) of incorrectly pointing out innocent users mistaken as colluders.

A collusion attack supposed in the reference [9] is that a plurality of contents (e.g., contents 1, 2, and 3) in which different watermark information items are respectively embedded are averaged as shown in FIG. 1 and a random disturbance is added thereafter. From the viewpoint of Ergun et al., the discussion previously made in the reference [4] will now be reconsidered. In the discussion in the reference [4], the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code is used as an element of the stochastic c-secure code. This $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code is obtained by directly multiplying coding, which takes

codewords at $(1,1,1)$ and $(-1,-1,-1)$ as shown in FIG. 2
($d=3$), by n times.

5 If the collusion attack supposed in the reference
[9] is applied to this $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code, a barycenter of
the averaged content obtained resides on a line
connecting $(1,1,1)$ with $(-1,-1,-1)$. In this case, if
the content after the collusion attack is near $(1,1,1)$
or $(-1,-1,-1)$, it is determined that the content has
not been changed by a collusion attack. Otherwise, if
10 the content after the collusion attack is near the
origin, it is determined that the content has been
changed by a collusion attack.

At this $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code, if there is a large bias
between the number of persons having the code of
15 $(1,1,1)$ among colluders and the number of persons
having the code of $(-1,-1,-1)$, the barycenter is
positioned to be very close to $(1,1,1)$ or $(-1,-1,-1)$
as a result of averaging. Since a random disturbance
is given thereafter, the algorithm which specifies
20 colluders may determine erroneously whether the content
has been shifted from $(1,1,1)$ or $(-1,-1,-1)$ by the
disturbance or from the barycenter by a disturbance
with in negligible probability. That is, as Ergun et
al. say that their conclusion is applicable to almost
25 all digital watermark algorithms, the coding of Boneh
et al. cannot avoid the limit of Ergun et al.

Meanwhile, as for the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code, the maximum

distance between two codewords is nd , and the minimum distance therebetween is as wide as d (see FIG. 3). This is because codewords are provided sparsely in a space of receiving signals since the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code is designed with importance on the resistance to collusion attacks.

A digital watermarking algorithm must embed a codeword having a maximum distance nd between codewords so that the quality of contents might not be influenced. If a digital watermarking algorithm embeds a codeword of the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code in a content space and this embedding has a characteristic that the distance between codewords is approximately proportional to the distance between contents which the codewords are embedded in, the maximum distance between an original content and a content after embedding watermark information is $nd/2$ or more. Therefore, if nd is large, influences to the quality of contents are large (the embedding 1 in FIG. 4).

If the digital watermarking algorithm sets all codewords situated at a substantially equal distance from the original content by such embedding that does not maintain a relationship between embedded content and the original content in the content space, the grounds for the resistance to collusion attacks, which the $\Gamma_0(n,d)$ code originally has, are lost (embedding 2 in FIG. 4).

That is, with the limit of Ergun et al. in mind,
it is desired to realize a digital watermarking
method by coding which properly realizes both of high
resistance to collusion attacks and low influence on
the quality of contents.

(Watermark Resistance to Collusion Attacks By Spread
Spectrum)

Meanwhile, in the digital watermarking method
based on spread spectrum, the embedding strength is set
so that embedding might not make large influences on
the quality of contents. Based thereon, pseudo-random
number sequences used for embedding correspond to
codewords.

Orthogonal transformation between the sample
value space and the frequency space is linear mapping.
Therefore, the collusion attack of Ergun et al.
operates to average the pseudo random number sequences
and further to give a disturbance, regardless of
whether the digital watermarking method to be attacked
is based on a space domain or a frequency domain.

In the digital watermarking method based on spread
spectrum, the pseudo random number sequences as
codewords are normally selected such that the cross-
correlations are substantially zero. Therefore, with
respect to a content obtained by averaging k contents,
it is considered that the correlation corresponding to
a colluder attenuates to $1/k$. If the cross-correlation

between pseudo random number sequences is sufficiently small and if k is not much large, the correlation value can exceed a predetermined threshold value in detection of a digital watermark, so colluders can be detected.

5 The method according to the reference [1] is based on a prerequisite of using an original content in detection, and detection is carried out with use of an amount called a similarity, in place of a correlation value. The similarity is obtained by normalizing a
10 cross-correlation value between a difference obtained by subtracting an original content from a detection-target content and a pseudo random number sequence used for embedding, by a square root of a self-correlation value of the difference.

15 In the detection using the similarity, the correlation value of a numerator attenuates to $1/k$ by averaging in a collusion attack, while the norm of a difference of a denominator also attenuates to $1/k$. Therefore, the similarity is expected not to attenuate.
20 However, if other noise is added than the averaging, the influence from the noise is rather enlarged by the normalization.

 In a reference [10] (Kilian, Joe, F. Thomas Leighton, Lesley R. Matheson, Talal G. Shamoon, Robert
25 E. Tarjan, and Francis Zane, "Resistance of Digital Watermarks to Collusive Attacks", Technical Report TR-585-98, Department of Computer Science, Princeton

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University, 1998), a theoretical consideration is made by statistical discussions on a subject that the digital watermarking method according to the reference [1] can prove resistance to collusion attacks of how many colluders. The pseudo random number sequence is supposed to be a Gaussian noise, and it is supposed that a collusion attack is achieved by statistically estimating an original content from contents which colluders own. As a result of this, it is concluded that resistance to collusion attacks from about several to over-ten colluders can be realized by realistic parameter setting.

Depending on the types of applications of digital watermarks, there is a case that detection using an original content cannot be carried out and a detection must be made from only the content as a detection target. In this case, the detection based on the similarity cannot be made. In this case, it is considered that tolerable number of colluders is much smaller.

All the discussions in the references [1] and [10] are based on a prerequisite that the cross-correlation between pseudo random number sequences as codewords is sufficiently small. However, it is considered that, as the number of pseudo random number sequences increases, the possibility at which a pair having a large cross-correlation value accidentally appears increases in

general, even if they are selected at random.

However, there remains an unsolved problem in how many pseudo random number sequences can reduce the cross-correlation value between an arbitrary pair, how pseudo random number sequences having such a characteristic can be selected, and what a digital watermarking method should be realized to achieve a method resistant to collusion attacks, by using the selected pseudo random number sequences as codewords.

This problem is considered as one of problems in how a digital watermarking method based on coding which properly realizes both of high resistance to collusion attacks and low influence on the quality of contents can be realized, after being conscious about the limits according to the reference [9] described previously in the article concerning the resistance to collusion attacks.

A method of using a M-sequence is known as a method for generating binary pseudo random bit sequences which have a small cross-correlation. The M-sequence is generated as an output of a linear feedback shift register (LFSR), if the LFSR has a tap corresponding to a coefficient of a primitive polynomial of an extension field of $GF(2)$. If 1 and 0 in the M-sequence are respectively replaced with +1 and -1, a PN-sequence is obtained. In the M-sequence, the appearance frequency of 0 is substantially equal to

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component code generating means for generating a plurality of codewords of component codes respectively expressing the residues obtained by the residue calculating means, each of the codeword of the component codeword being a codeword expressing a code obtained by the residue calculating means and being constructed by continuous sequences of 1 and 0 using a predetermined number of bits as a unit; and concatenating means for concatenating the codewords of the component codes generated by the component code generating means, thereby to generate the codeword to be embedded.

A first code detecting unit according to the present invention, corresponding to the first code embedding unit, comprises: code dividing means for dividing an embedded codeword which concatenates a plurality of codewords of component codes constructed by continuous sequences of 1 and 0 using a predetermined number of nits as a unit, into codewords of the component codes; component code decoding means for decoding each of the codewords of the component codes divided, thereby to obtain a plurality of residues pairs each comprising two residues, taking a plurality of integers which are predetermined and are prime to each other, as modulus; and colluder number calculating means for calculating a user identification number of a colluder who made a collusion attack on the content,

from the plurality of residue pairs.

Also, this unit further comprises collusion
determining means for determining presence or absence
of a collusion from the plurality of residue pairs,
5 wherein the colluder identification number calculating
means may calculate the user identification number of
the colluder, if presence of a collusion is determined
by the collusion determining means.

The colluder number calculating means includes:
10 a residue selecting section for selecting one residue
from each of k' inputted residues pairs, thereby to
generate a set of k' residues $(R_1, R_2, \dots, R_{k'})$;
a Chinese remainder theorem section for calculating
a candidate of a user identification number u of
15 a colluder, from k residues (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k) which are
selected from the set of k' residues generated by the
residue selecting section, and a consistency checking
section for selecting the k residues from the set of k'
residues generated by the residue selecting section,
20 for supplying the k residues to the Chinese remainder
theorem section, for specifying a user identification
number of the colluder from the candidate of the user
identification number u of the colluder calculated
by the Chinese remainder theorem section, and for
25 outputting the user identification number of the
colluder, wherein the consistency checking section
has selection processing for selecting the k residues

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from the set of k' residues generated by the residue selecting section, determination processing for determining whether or not a relationship of $R_i = u \bmod p_i$ ($i = i_1, i_2, \dots, i_\ell$) exists between the candidate of the user identification number u of the colluder calculated by the Chinese remainder theorem section and a predetermined number (ℓ) of residues among remaining ($k' - k$) residues, and output processing for outputting the candidate as a user identification number of a colluder if the relationship exists as a result of the determination processing, if the relationship does not exist, a new combination of k residues (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k) is selected from the set of the k' residues generated by the residue selecting section, thereby to carry out the determination processing, and if the relationship does not exist with respect to any of all combinations of k residues (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k), a new set of k' residues is requested to the residue selecting section, and the selection processing and the determination processing are repeated until the relationship exists.

A second code generating unit according to the present invention comprises: calculating means for calculating a set of a plurality of integral elements in correspondence with an inputted user identification number; component code generating means for generating codewords of component codes respectively in correspondence with the integral factors, such that among k'

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(1)

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The calculating means calculates a set of integral elements, which is the set of residues with the

transformation, as the set of integral elements, in
correspondence with the inputted user identification
number, and where p_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) is one same
positive integer p . In the later case, a condition of

10 is further satisfied.

A second code detecting unit according to the present invention, corresponding to the second code generating unit, comprises: codeword extracting means for extracting an embedded code from a target in which the embedded codeword is embedded, the embedded codeword concatenating codewords of component codes respectively generated in correspondence with an inputted user identification number and also being such that among k' component codes capable of expressing all sets of integral elements that are calculated with respect to a predetermined number of user identification numbers, k combinations of the k' component codes can uniquely express the user identification numbers; code dividing means for making a division into extracted component codes; component code decoding means for decoding each of the component codes divided; and colluder number calculating means for calculating

a user identification number of a colluder from
a decoding result of each of the component codes,
wherein k' is determined to be $c(k+l)/q$ or more where
 c is a positive integer of 3 or more, l is a positive
integer, and q is a number of the integral elements
which can be detected from each of the component codes
when detecting the embedded code.

The set of integral elements is a set of residues,
which are calculated in correspondence with the user
identification number and take a plurality of integers
relatively prime to each other as modulus, or a set of
numbers of elements which are calculated in corre-
spondence with the user identification number and
belong to an equivalence class defined by a parallel
transformation. In the latter case, the condition of
(2) is further satisfied in addition to the condition
of (1), where p_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) is one same positive
integer p .

A third code detecting unit according to the
present invention comprises: code extracting means
for extracting an embedded codeword from a target in
which the embedded codeword is embedded, the embedded
codeword concatenating the codewords of component codes
respectively generated in correspondence with an
inputted user identification number and also being such
that among k' component codes capable of expressing all
sets of integral elements that are calculated with

respect to user identification numbers, k combinations
of the k' component codes can uniquely express the
user identification numbers; code dividing means for
dividing the extracted codeword into codewords of the
5 component codes; component code decoding means for
decoding each of the component codes divided; and
colluder number calculating means for calculating
a user identification number of a colluder from a
decoding result of each of the component codes, wherein
10 the component code decoding means includes a block
dividing section for dividing each of the component
codes into blocks, a counting section for counting
a number of bits of "1" in every one of the blocks,
a first determining section for determining whether
15 or not a count value obtained by the counting section
exceeds a first threshold value, a second determining
section for determining whether or not the count value
is smaller than a second threshold value, a minimum
position selecting section for selecting a minimum
20 block determined as exceeding the first threshold
value by the first determining section, and a maximum
position selecting section for selecting a maximum
block selected as being smaller than the second
threshold value, thereby to output a selection results
25 of the minimum and maximum position selecting sections,
as a decoding result.

Further, according to the present invention, there

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is provided a watermark embedding unit for embedding a codeword generated by the first or second code generating unit, as watermark information, into an embedding target content.

5 Another watermark embedding unit according to the present invention is a watermark embedding unit for embedding watermark information containing information of a user identification number into a content as an embedding target, and comprises: means for outputting
10 one codeword selected from a plurality of codewords composing a simplex code, in correspondence with an inputted user identification number; and means for embedding the outputted codeword as the watermark information into the content as an embedding target.

15 Another watermark detecting unit according to the present invention is a watermark detecting unit for detecting watermark information containing information of a user identification number from an inputted content, and comprises: means for outputting one
20 codeword selected from a plurality of codewords composing a simplex code, in correspondence with an inputted user identification number; means for obtaining a correlation value between the outputted codeword and the content; and means for determining
25 presence or absence of a codeword corresponding to the inputted user identification number in the content, based on the correlation value.

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In the code generating unit, code decoding unit, watermark embedding unit, and watermark detecting unit according to the present invention as described above, it is possible to attain robustness to collusion attacks without increasing the code length of the embedded code as watermark information so much, even if the total number of users and colluders is large.

Also, by satisfying the condition of $k' \geq c(k+l)/q$ and the conditions (1) and (2), it is possible to realize a code generating unit capable of generating a sufficient and proper code to be embedded, based on correct evaluation of an error rate when detecting a code to be embedded, and a code decoding unit capable of generating the embedded coded, even if three or more colluders participate in an alteration.

As explained above, according to the present invention, it is possible to maintain robustness to collusion attacks without deteriorating the quality of contents by embedding watermark information having a small code length, even if the total number of users and colluders is large, in the watermark embedding unit and the watermark detecting unit forming part of a fingerprinting system. Also, it is possible to attain robustness to other attacks such as irreversible compression and the like.

Also, if different device control information items are embedded in one same content when watermark

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The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and constitute a part of the specification,

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FIG. 8 is a block diagram showing the structure of the component code generating section in FIG. 7;

FIG. 10 is a block diagram showing the structure of the code detecting section in FIG. 6B;

FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing the structure of the consistency checking section in FIG. 11;

FIG. 14 is a flowchart showing the processing flow in the Chinese remainder theorem section in FIG. 10;

FIG. 16 is a block diagram showing the structure of the code generating section according to the second embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 18 is a flowchart showing the processing flow in the user ID assigning section in FIG. 17;

FIG. 20 is a block diagram showing the structure of the code detecting section according to the second

embodiment;

FIG. 21 is a block diagram showing the structure of the colluder ID calculating section in FIG. 20;

FIG. 22 is a flowchart showing the processing flow in the colluder ID calculating section and the colluder ID candidate generating section in FIG. 21;

FIG. 23 is a flowchart showing the processing flow in the colluder ID candidate discriminating section in FIG. 21;

FIG. 24 shows the correspondence relationship between the colluder ID detected with respect to an actual colluder ID, the number (x) of satisfied congruencies, and non-weak ID (1) or not (0) where the number of colluders is 32;

FIG. 25 shows the correspondence relationship between the colluder ID detected with respect to an actual colluder ID, the number (x) of satisfied congruencies, and non-weak ID (1) or not (0) where the number of colluders is 64;

FIG. 26 is a block diagram showing the structure of the code generating section according to the third embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 27 is a block diagram showing the structure of the code detecting section according to the third embodiment;

FIG. 28 is a block diagram showing the structure of the code generating section according to the fourth

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FIG. 29 is a block diagram showing the structure of the component code generating section based on equivalence class in FIG. 28;

FIG. 30 is a view showing that a set of quotients
can be defined by equivalence class based on parallel
transformation, according to the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 31 is a view showing an example of
equivalence class based on parallel transformation
10 according to the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 32 is a view showing an example of equivalence class where $k=3$ is given, according to the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 33 is a block diagram showing the structure
15 of the code detecting section according to the fourth
embodiment;

FIG. 34 is a block diagram showing the structure of the component code generating section based on equivalence class in FIG. 33;

20 FIG. 35 is a graph explaining the component code
generating section based on equivalence class shown in
FIG. 34;

FIG. 36 is a block diagram showing the structure of the colluder ID calculating section in FIG. 33;

25 FIG. 37 is a block diagram showing the structure
of the watermark embedding unit according to the fifth
embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 39 is a block diagram showing the structure
5 of the watermark detecting unit according to the fifth
embodiment;

FIG. 41 is a block diagram showing another example of the simplex code generating section in the fifth to sixth embodiments of the present invention.

15 FIG. 5 is a conceptual view showing a finger-printing system as an example of a system to which a watermark embedding unit 1 and a watermark detecting unit 2 according to the present invention.

A collusion attack as described previously is

made on the code-embedded content on the distribution route 3. To resist this kind of collusion attack, the watermark detecting unit 2 based on the present invention generates a collusion attack determination signal indicating presence or absence of a collusion attack, a colluder ID (a user ID of the colluder), and a proper user ID in case where no collusion attack is made.

In the following, explanation will be made of embodiments of the watermark embedding unit and the watermark detecting unit.

(First Embodiment)

A watermark embedding unit and a watermark detecting unit in which a c-secure code with ϵ -error having a smaller code length than a conventional example is used as an embedded code will be explained as a first embodiment of the present invention.

FIGS. 6A and 6B show schematic structures of the watermark embedding unit and watermark detecting unit according to the first embodiment of the present invention. The watermark embedding unit shown in FIG. 6A is comprised of a code generating section 11 for generating a code of a user ID to be embedded, which is watermark information to be embedded, and a code embedding section 12 for embedding the generated code into a target content, thereby to obtain a code-embedded content. Meanwhile the watermark detecting

unit shown in FIG. 6B is comprised of an embedded-code
extracting section 13 for extracting an embedded code
from a target content (e.g., a code-embedded content),
and an embedded code detecting section 14 for detecting
and decoding the extracted embedded code.

FIG. 7 shows a structure of the code-generating
section 11. This code generating section 11 is
comprised of k' of modulus storage sections 21-1, 21-2,
..., 21- k' of residue calculating sections 22-1, 22-2,
..., 22- k' of component code generating sections 24-1,
24-2, ..., 24- k' , a code parameter storage section 23,
and a code concatenating section 25.

Integers which are relatively prime to each other
are stored in the modulus storage sections 21-1, 21-2,
..., 21- k' . In this example, k' different relatively
prime numbers p_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) are stored. These
relatively prime numbers p_i are supplied as moduli to
the residue calculating sections 22-1, 22-2, ..., 22- k' .
The residue calculating sections 22-1, 22-2, ..., 22- k'
respectively obtain residues $u_i = u \bmod p_i$ ($i=1, 2, \dots, k$)
with respect to a user ID u . That is, residues
 $u_i = u \bmod p_i$ ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) are calculated as a set
of a plurality of integral elements corresponding to
an inputted user ID, by the residue calculating
sections 22-1, 22-2, ..., 22- k' .

The component code generating sections 24-1, 24-2,
..., 24- k' respectively generate component codes

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$\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ consisting of $\Gamma_0(n, d)$ codes described above, which express the residues u_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) obtained by the residue calculating sections 22-1, 22-2, \dots , 22- k' in accordance with a code parameter d stored in the code parameter storage section 23. That is, in the component code generating sections 24-1, 24-2, \dots , 24- k' , each of k combinations among k' component codes that can express all sets of the residues u_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) that are calculated by the residue calculating sections 22-1, 22-2, \dots , 22- k' with respect to a predetermined number (n) of user IDs generates a component code $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ capable of uniquely expressing the user IDs, with respect to each residue.

The code concatenating section 25 concatenates the component codes $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ generated by the component code generating sections 24-1, 24-2, \dots , 24- k' , thereby to generate a code to be embedded as watermark information.

FIG. 8 shows the structure of one of the component code generating sections 24-1, 24-2, \dots , 24- k' . Where the code parameter is t , the residue is u_i , and the modulus is p_i , $p_i - u_i - 1$ is obtained by a subtracting section 31. The "0" sequence generating section 32 generates a "0" sequence consisting of sequential $t \times u_i$ bits, based on the code parameter t and the residue u_i . The "1" sequence generating section 33 generates a "1" sequence of sequential $t \times (p_i - u_i - 1)$

bits, based on the code parameter d and an output $p_i - u_{i-1}$ from the subtracting section 31. Further, these "0" and "1" sequences are concatenated by the concatenating section 34, so the a bit sequence of $t \times (p_i - 1)$ bits is generated as a component code $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ constructed by the $\Gamma_0(n, d)$ code.

FIG. 9 shows an example of component codes thus generated. Component codes of $B(9), \dots, B(n-2)$ block "0" sequences are assigned to n user IDs from 0 to $n-1$.

FIG. 10 shows the structure of the embedded-code detecting section 14 in FIG. 6B. The embedded-code detecting section 14 is comprised of a code division section 41, component code decoding sections 42-1, 42-2, \dots , 42- k' , a user ID calculating section 43, collusion discriminating sections 44-1, 44-2, \dots , 44- k' , a collusion discriminating OR section 45, and a colluder ID calculating section 46.

An embedded code as watermark information extracted from a target content by the embedded-code extracting section 13 is divided into component codes by the code division section 41, which are thereafter decoded by the component code decoding sections 42-1, 42-2, \dots , 42- k' , thereby to generate residue pairs corresponding to a user ID.

From one residue of each residue pair thus generated, a user ID is calculated by the user ID calculating section 43. In addition, the collusion

discriminating sections 44-1, 44-2, ..., 44-k' determine presence or absence of a collusion attack from the residue pairs, respectively. With respect to the determination results from the collusion discriminating sections 44-1, 44-2, ..., 44-k', a logical sum (OR) is calculated thereby to determine whether or not a collusion attack has existed. Further, if it is determined that a collusion attack exists, the colluder ID calculating section 46 calculates a colluder ID from each residue pair, and the colluder is thereby specified.

FIG. 11 shows a detailed structure of the colluder ID calculating section 46. The colluder ID calculating section 46 is comprised of a residue selecting section 51 for selecting one residue from each k' residue pairs, a consistency checking section 52 for selecting k residues among the selected k' residues, a Chinese remainder theorem section 53 for applying a Chinese remainder theorem to the k residues selected by the consistency checking section 52, thereby to obtain a colluder ID candidate.

FIG. 12 shows an internal structure of the consistency checking section 52 shown in FIG. 11. The colluder ID candidate obtained by the Chinese remainder theorem 53 is fed back to the consistency checking section 52, and a consistency check is carried out with respect to the other (k'-k) residues among the k'

residues, so a colluder ID is obtained finally.

The consistency checking section 52 shown in FIG. 12 is comprised of a generating section 521 for generating $(k+l)$ sets of residues, and a consistency checking section 522 for a set of residues l and the colluder ID candidate. Operation of them will be explained later.

According to the watermark embedding unit and the watermark detecting unit in the present embodiment, watermarking is possible with less deterioration of the quality of contents even if the total number of users or colluders is large. Detailed explanation will be made below.

Suppose that n is the total number of users and c is the maximum value of the total number of colluders. Meanwhile, when arbitrary k elements are selected from k' relatively prime numbers $p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{k'}$ prepared in the storage sections 21-1, 21-2, \dots , 21- k' shown in FIG. 7, the product of arbitrary k numbers in these k' relatively prime numbers are supposed to be n or more. For example, this product is $n \leq p_1 \times p_2 \times \dots \times p_{k'}$.

In the code generating section 12, component codes $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ are generated by the component code generating sections 24-1, 24-2, \dots , 24- k' shown in FIG. 7 with respect to the relatively prime numbers p_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$). These component codes $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ are concatenated by the code concatenating section 25, thereby to generate a new code $\Gamma(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_{k'}; n, t)$.

If the user ID of each user is supposed to be u , the codeword of the concatenated code $\Gamma(p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k; n, t)$ is a codeword which expresses residues $u \bmod p_i$ calculated by the residue calculating sections 22-1, 22-2, \dots , 22-k' wherein each component code $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ takes the relatively prime number p_i corresponding to its user ID u as modulus. This codeword is embedded as watermark information (or an embedded code) into a target content.

If a collusion attack may have been made on a code-embedded content thus obtained, the component codes $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$ divided by code division section 41 are respectively decoded by the component code decoding sections 42-1, 42-2, \dots , 42-k', in the watermark detecting unit shown in FIG. 10, so that a pair of residues concerning p_i of given two user IDs among c users. This will be called a residue pair concerning p_i .

Also, if a certain residue among a residue pair concerning p_i is a residue of a colluder who maintains a certain user ID u , it will be said that the residue is caused by the colluder who is assigned the user ID u . At this time, with respect to a user who have a residue value equal to that of the colluder, including this colluder, it will be said that there is a possibility that the residue can be caused by the user ID of the user.

Let Z be a set of all integers, if $u_i \in Z/p_iZ$ is given with respect to each of i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k$)

where different k prime numbers p_1, p_2, \dots, p_k are

If the Chinese remainder theorem is adopted and if residues corresponding to arbitrary k relatively prime numbers among k' relatively prime numbers are supplied to the Chinese remainder theorem section 53, as shown in FIG. 11, a user ID can be determined uniquely

Hence, another extra residue is prepared, and the consistency between $(k+l)$ residues is checked thereby to verify the properness of the obtained user ID.

In other words, a check is made on existence of a solution of $(k+\ell)$ simultaneous congruent equations.

For example, remainders are obtained by dividing a user ID obtained from k residues, by integers $p_{k+1}, \dots, p_{k+\ell}$ corresponding to the other residues $r_{k+1}, \dots, r_{k+\ell}$.

A colluder can be determined depending on whether or not the remainders are respectively equal to the

residues $r_{k+1}, \dots, r_{k+\ell}$.

That is, in the consistency checking section 52 shown in FIG. 11, $k'=c(k+\ell)/2$ residues which are respectively selected from the k' residue pairs by the residue selecting section 51 shown in FIG. 11 are inputted to the generating section 521 for $(k+\ell)$ -tuple of sets of residues, as shown in FIG. 12. From these k' residues, k residues are selected and supplied to the Chinese remainder theorem section 53. Further, a check is made on the consistency between a set of residues and a colluder ID candidate by the consistency check section 522, thereby to output a colluder ID (i.e., the user ID of a colluder).

In case where the total number of colluders is two, this method can be realized relatively easily (for example, Japanese Patent Applications No. 10-108039 and 10-122108). This is expanded to the number of general colluders.

Suppose that n is the total number of users and c is the maximum number of colluders. The n -secure code (cubic length n -secure code with ε -error) having a ε -error introduced in the reference [13] previously described is defined as follows.

(Definition 1)

A $((n-1)d, n)$ code $\Gamma_0(n, d)$ is defined as a code whose words $w^{(0)}, \dots, w^{(n-1)}$ satisfy the next condition.

$$w^{(i)}|_{B_j} = \begin{cases} \{0\}^d & \text{for } i > j \\ \{1\}^d & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

In this equation, $w^{(i)}|_{B_j}$ limits the codeword $w^{(i)}$ to a set B_j of bit positions. A set B_i (where $i=0, \dots, n-2$) is called blocks and is constructed by d bit positions. Different blocks do not have a common part ($B_i \cap B_j = \emptyset$ with respect to $i \neq j$).

Suppose that ordering such as serial numbers can be assigned to all users. Suppose also that a codeword $w^{(i)}$ is assigned to the i -th user. Suppose further that user are not informed of the serial numbers assigned to themselves.

The linear length n -secure code with ε -error, which has been introduced in the references [12] and [14], is the same as the code defined by the definition 1 but has a different detection algorithm. This code is capable of specifying two colluders one of which has the maximum serial number and the other of which has the minimum serial number. The code length thereof is $\Theta(n)$.

(Theorem 1)

Suppose that the following detection algorithm 1 is applied to the code $\Gamma_0(n, d)$. If $d = \log_2(2/\varepsilon)$ is given, this code is a n -secure code with ε -error. (Detection Algorithm 1)

(1) Input a detected code $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Suppose that $\ell = (n-1)d$ and $d = \log(2/\varepsilon)$ are given.

(4) Output s and t .

Suppose that k , k' , and ℓ are positive integers that satisfy $k' = c(k + \ell)/2$. Suppose also that $p_1, \dots, p_{k'}$ are integers that are relatively prime to each other. Suppose also that p is the minimum one of $p_1, \dots, p_{k'}$. Suppose also that the product of k smallest integers selected from $p_1, \dots, p_{k'}$ is n or more. These integers $p_1, \dots, p_{k'}$ will be called factors hereinafter. The set of these integers will be called factor basis.

(Definition 2)

Here, C_i is a set of bit positions corresponding

A coding algorithm for generating an embedded code is as follows.

(1) Input user ID $u \in \{0, \dots, n-1\}$.

(2-1) Calculate $u \bmod p_i$ and generate codewords

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10      (3) Concatenate the generated codewords to make
      one codeword  $w(u)$ .

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At most, two integers $r_i(-), r_i(+) \in \mathbb{Z}_{p_i}$ are obtained by applying a detection algorithm 1 to the components of $\Gamma(p_1, \dots, p_k'; n, t)$. In this definition, $0 \leq r_i(-) \leq r_i(+) \leq p_i - 1$ is given.

20 (Definition 4)

Suppose that r is a residue of $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$. If a colluder who satisfies $r \equiv u \pmod{p_i}$ exists among a set of colluders, the residue r is called r which arises from u . If r satisfies $r \equiv u \pmod{p_i}$ regardless of whether or not a user is a colluder, the residue r is called r which possibly arises from u .

(Definition 5)

If all of a set of m residues give one same user ID when the Chinese remainder theorem is applied to arbitrary k residues among the set of residues
5 corresponding to m relatively prime numbers (m -tuple of residues), this kind of set is called to be consistent.

Further, if all residues of a consistent set of residues arise from the user ID of an obtained
10 colluder, the set of residues is called to be truly consistent. Otherwise, this set of residues is called to be falsely consistent.

(Detection Algorithm 2)

- (1) Input a detected code $x \in \{0,1\}^L$. Suppose that $L = (p_{ave}-1)k't$
15 (2) Decompose x into k' limited $x|_{C_i}$, $i=1, \dots, k'$.
(3) Execute the following from $i=1$ to k' .
(3-1) Apply the detection algorithm 1 to $x|_{C_i}$.
(4) Execute the following with respect to all
20 m -tuple of a set of residues.
(4-1) Execute the following if the set of m -tuple of residues is consistent.
(4-2) Output its solution as a colluder and stop.
(5) Make an output saying that no colluder has
25 been detected.

(Theorem 2)

Suppose $t \geq \log_2(4k'/\varepsilon)$. If the following

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$$\left[1 - \left\{1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{p}\right)^c\right\}^l\right]^{k \cdot C_{k+l} \cdot 2^{k+l}} > 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \quad (4)$$

5 $L = (p_{ave} - 1)k't.$
 (Lemma 1)

10 (Proof of Lemma 1)

15 (Generalization of Lemma 1)

20 (Proof of Generalized Lemma 1)

Since reconstruction and inspection of a colluder

ID (the user ID of a colluder) require $(k+\ell)$ residues, $qk'/c \geq k+\ell$ must exist from a result of the generated lemma 1. The factor q/c in the left side is shifted to the right side of the inequality. A condition

5 $k' \geq c(k+\ell)/q$ is obtained. Actually, since k' is an integer, $k' \geq \lceil c(k+\ell)/q \rceil$.

(Lemma 2)

Suppose $t \geq \log_2(2k'/\epsilon)$. When the above-described detection algorithm 1 is applied to the code

10 $\Gamma(p_1, \dots, p_{k'}; n, t)$, the approval error rate of k' residue pairs (the probability at which a residue that does not arise from any colluder is contained in k' residue pairs) is ϵ or less.

(Proof of Lemma 2)

15 When the detection algorithm is applied to an element $\Gamma_0(p_i, t)$, the detection error rate of residue pairs is ϵ/k' or less if $t \geq \log_2(2k'/\epsilon)$ is given from the theorem 1. Since total k' elements exist, the detection error rate is ϵ or less with respect to all

20 residue pairs.

(Lemma 3)

When a consistent set of m residues (m -tuple of residues) and a residue from a residue pair corresponding to another factor p is added to this set

25 to construct a set of $(m+1)$ residues, the probability at which the $(m+1)$ residues of this set is falsely consistent is $1-(1-1/p)^C$ or less.

(Proof of Lemma 3)

Each residue pair is constructed by the maximum and minimum values among residues taking p with respect to user IDs of all colluders, as modulus. Since users do not know their own user IDs, it is expected that the probability at which a user ID belongs to a colluder when a collusion attack is carried out is considered to be uniform independently from the user ID. Accordingly, the probability at which a residue of a colluder takes a certain value is equally $1/p$.

When residues of c colluders are all distributed uniformly, the probability $\Pr[x]$ at which the maximum residue takes a certain value $c \in \mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ is given as follows.

$$\Pr[x] = \begin{cases} \left(1 - \frac{x}{p}\right)^c - \left(1 - \frac{x+1}{p}\right)^c & \text{for } x \neq p-1 \\ \left(\frac{1}{p}\right)^c & \text{for } x = p-1 \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

(Lemma 4)

When the following condition is satisfied, the probability at which a falsely consistent set of $(k+\ell)$ residues exists is ε or less as indicated by the next equation.

$$\left[1 - \left\{1 - (1 - 1/p)^c\right\}^l\right]^{c(k+\ell)/2 \cdot C_{k+\ell} \times 2^{k+\ell}} > 1 - \varepsilon \quad (6)$$

(Proof of Lemma 4)

A set of $(k+\ell)$ residues that can be selected from k' residue pairs can take $k' \cdot C_{k+\ell} \times 2^{k+\ell}$ combinations.

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From the lemma 14, the probability at which the set of
(k+l) residues is falsely consistent is $(1-(1-1/p)^c)^\ell$.
Accordingly, an upper limit described below is given
to the probability at which at least one falsely
consistent set of (k+l) residues appears in all
combinations.

$$P_F \leq 1 - \left[1 - \left\{ 1 - (1-1/p)^c \right\}^\ell \right]^{k' C_{k+l} \times 2^{k+l}} \quad (7)$$

When the condition equation of the lemma 1 exists,
the probability P_F is ϵ or less.

(Proof of Theorem 2)

There are two causes that make an innocent user
erroneously detected as a colluder. One is a detection
error of a residue pair, and the other is a selection
of a falsely consistent set of residues. If the
probabilities of these two causes are each $\epsilon/2$ or
less, the detection error rate is ϵ or less. From the
lemmas 2 and 4, the equation of the upper limit is
obtained.

In place of using a minimum factor as a lower
limit to restrict the probability at which a falsely
consistent set of residues is excluded, ℓ factors from
the smallest one are used to restrict the lower limit.
Then, a much smaller upper limit which has a code
length as shown in the next equation (8) can be
obtained in place of the equation (4).

$$\left[1 - \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \left\{ 1 - \left(1 - \frac{1}{p_i} \right)^c \right\} \right]^{c(k+\ell)/2 C_{k+\ell} \times 2^{k+\ell}} \geq 1 - \frac{\varepsilon}{2} \quad (8)$$

Here, p_1, \dots, p_{ℓ} are ℓ smallest parameters selected from p_1, \dots, p_k (where $p_1 < p_2 < \dots < p_k$). The ℓ parameters may be selected in the order from the smallest one, one selected in the order from the smallest one from the $(k+1)$ -th one up to the $(k+\ell)$ -th smallest one, or the ℓ parameters selected in the order from the smallest one up to the $(k+\ell)$ -th smallest one. In addition, p_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) is a value which each residue (integral element) calculated by the residue calculating section with respect to c user IDs can take. In the present embodiment, p_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$) are k' factors prepared by the modulus storage sections 21-1, 21-2, \dots , 21- k' described previously.

The meaning of the equation (8) will now be explained. At first, the left hand side of the equation (8) gives a lower limit to the probability at which a detection correctly specifies a colluder ID. That is, the "power" attached to the shoulder of the bracket in the left hand side cites an example where $(k+\ell)$ residues are selected from k' residue pairs. The entire of the right hand side means the moderation of the probability at which whether or not a colluder ID is correct or not is made with respect to each selection.

The contents of the bracket in the left hand side of the equation (8) will be explained in details. In each of the selections described above, whether or not a collusion ID is correct is approved by ℓ extra residues. The part of the product depending on Π in the bracket gives an upper limit to the probability at which an incorrect colluder ID is mistaken as being correct by all of ℓ approvals. This is because the lower limit of the probability at which each approval determines an incorrect colluder ID as being correct is given by a result obtained by replacing the number p of integral elements (residues) that can be detected from each component code, with a factor corresponding to the residues, with respect to the given probability $1-(1-1/p)^C$ in the lemma 3.

The ℓ factors corresponding to the residues used for an approval is a combination which maximizes the lower limit of the probability at which an incorrect approval is carried out by the combination, in case where the combination comprised of the smallest factors is p_1, p_2, \dots, p_ℓ . Therefore, the product part based on Π gives an upper limit to the probability at which all of ℓ approvals mistakes an incorrect colluder ID as being correct. Therefore, in the equation (8), the lower limit of the probability at which a correct colluder ID is detected, expressed in the left hand side, means a condition for satisfying $1-\epsilon/2$ or more,

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The Chinese remainder theorem section 53 calculates a colluder ID u in accordance with the Chinese remainder theorem (step S4). The calculation using this Chinese remainder theorem is executed in accordance with the processing flow shown in the flowchart of FIG. 14. The calculated collusion ID u is returned to the consistency checking section 52.

The consistency checking section 52 determines whether or not there is a case that a relation of $R_i = u \bmod p_i$ ($i = i_1, i_2, \dots, i_\ell$) is satisfied between a predetermined number (ℓ) of residues among the other remaining ($k' - k$) residues (step S5). If this relationship is satisfied, the consistency checking section 52 outputs u as a colluder ID (step S6).

If the relationship is not satisfied, new different k residues (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k) are selected from a set of k' residues inputted in the step S3 and are supplied to the Chinese remainder theorem section 53 until it is satisfied.

If it is determined in the step S7 that a set of k residues (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k) is the last candidate, the consistency checking section 52 request a new set of k residues from the residue selecting section 51 (step S8). Until the relationship of $R_i = u \bmod p_i$ ($i = i_1, i_2, \dots, i_\ell$) is satisfied in the step S5, the processing of the steps S3, S4, and S7 is repeated. If there is no new set of k residues (S_1, S_2, \dots, S_k), it is

At last, explanation will be made of the processing flow in the embedded-code detecting section 14 in the present embodiment, with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG. 15.

15 If none of the collusion discriminating sections
44-1, 44-2, ..., 44-k' determines presence of a
collusion, a user ID is calculated by the user ID
calculating section 43 (step S14), and this user ID is
outputted (step S15).

In this case, processing can be carried out easily

at a high speed, with respect to the determination of presence or absence of a collusion attack in the step S13 and the calculation of the user ID in the step S14. On the contrary, the calculation of a colluder ID in the step S17 takes a long time although wasteful calculations can be omitted by firstly executing a determination of presence or absence of a collusion attack and by executing the calculation of a colluder ID only in case where presence of a collusion attack is determined.

If the watermark detecting unit according to the present invention is applied to a user device, use of the unit may be controlled, e.g., determination is made only on the presence or absence of a collusion attack, and use of the unit is stopped depending on the result of the determination. Therefore, calculation (specification) of a colluder need not always be carried out.

Thus, according to the present embodiment, robustness to collusion attacks can be maintained in case where the total number of users or colluders is large while the code length of a code to be embedded is restricted.

(Second Embodiment)

FIG. 16 shows a structure of a code generating section 11 according to the second embodiment of the present invention. In the code generating section 11

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one after another (step S22). Used as the user ID candidates are IDs which are not yet assigned (or used).

5 Next, whether or not the user ID candidate is
a weak ID is discriminated with respect to the user IDs
sequentially by the user ID candidate discriminating
section 262 (step S23). A weak ID is such a user ID
that can be erroneously detected as a colluder ID at
a high probability although the user ID is not
10 a colluder ID among a plurality of user ID candidates,
i.e., although the user ID is the user ID of an
innocent user (who is not a colluder). From the
meaning that the user ID is weak against erroneous
detection, it is called a weak ID. If a user ID
15 candidate is discriminated as a weak ID as a result of
discrimination in the step S23, the processing returns
to the step S22 where a next user ID candidate is
generated, and discrimination is then made again in the
step S23.

20 If a user ID candidate is not a weak ID as
a result of discrimination in the step S23, i.e., if
a user ID candidate is a user ID which is erroneously
detected as a colluder ID at a lower possibility
(this kind of user ID is called a non-weak ID with the
25 meaning of an ID which is not weak against erroneous
detection), the user ID candidate determining section
263 determines the user ID candidate as a user ID to be

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assigned to the user specifying data inputted through the step S21 (step S24).

With reference to the flowchart shown in FIG. 19, explanation will be made of a specific procedure of discrimination processing in the step S23 of discriminating whether a user ID candidate is a weak ID or a non-weak ID.

At first, user ID candidates generated in the step S22 are sequentially inputted one after another (step S31), and the probability (detection error rate) at which each of the user ID candidate is erroneously detected as a colluder ID is estimated (step S32). For example, the estimation of the detection error rate is carried out as follows with use of parameters p_i , k , k' , and c . At first, the following equation is defined.

$$\Pr[x; p, c] = \begin{cases} \left(1 - \frac{x}{p}\right)^c - \left(1 - \frac{x+1}{p}\right)^c & \text{for } x \neq p-1 \\ \left(\frac{1}{p}\right)^c & \text{for } x = p-1 \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

Next, the following is defined.

$$Q[x; p, c] = \Pr[x; p, c] + \Pr[p-1-x; p, c] \quad (10)$$

The following evaluation value EEF is calculated as an amount which expresses substantially the probability at which a user ID (set as u) is erroneously detected as a colluder ID.

(11)

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(12)

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5 In other words, the user ID assigning section 26
is arranged such that a weak ID which is easily
detected erroneously as a colluder ID among a plurality
of user ID candidates might not be assigned as a user
ID to inputted user specifying data. In this manner,
0 the probability of erroneous detection can be reduced
to be small. It may be arranged such that, if a weak
ID should be detected as a colluder ID, it may not be
taken as a colluder ID.

Meanwhile, a weak ID makes a large influence on determination of the code length of an embedded code. Suppose that a user ID is detected in a watermark detecting unit. It is necessary to prepare a factor base consisting of a very large number of factors (e.g., integers which are stored in the modulus storage sections 21-1, 21-2, ..., 21-k' and which are relatively prime to each other, such as k' different relatively prime numbers p_i ($i=1, 2, \dots, k'$)), in order to reduce the detection error probability to be smaller than a tolerable probability, even if the user ID is a weak ID. However, if an embedded code has some detection error probability without excluding weak IDs, an equivalent detection error rate can be realized by an

embedded code having a factor basis consisting of much less factors, by excluding weak IDs from user IDs.

This can be explained as follows. Where a given user ID is u , an event that u is detected is expressed as $\text{detect}(u)$, an event that u is a weak ID is expressed as $\text{weak}(u)$, and an event that u is a colluder ID is expressed as $\text{collude}(u)$. At this time, the following exists.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{detect}(u) &= \text{detect}(u) \wedge \text{weak}(u) \wedge \text{collude}(u) \\ &\vee \text{detect}(u) \wedge \text{weak}(u) \wedge \neg \text{collude}(u) \\ &\vee \text{detect}(u) \wedge \neg \text{weak}(u) \wedge \text{collude}(u) \\ &\vee \text{detect}(u) \wedge \neg \text{weak}(u) \wedge \neg \text{collude}(u) \end{aligned} \quad (13)$$

Therefore, the following is given.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Pr}[\text{detect}(u)] &= \text{Pr}[\text{detect}(u) \wedge \text{weak}(u) \wedge \text{collude}(u)] \\ &+ \text{Pr}[\text{detect}(u) \wedge \text{weak}(u) \wedge \neg \text{collude}(u)] \\ &+ \text{Pr}[\text{detect}(u) \wedge \neg \text{weak}(u) \wedge \text{collude}(u)] \\ &+ \text{Pr}[\text{detect}(u) \wedge \neg \text{weak}(u) \wedge \neg \text{collude}(u)] \end{aligned} \quad (14)$$

In these equations, the second and fourth terms in the right hand side in the equation (14) contribute to the detection error rate. To shorten the code length, it is preferable to adopt a method in which an approval of a colluder ID candidate can be made by a much smaller number (k') of factors, without reducing the detection error rate. In case where an approval of a colluder ID candidate is made simply by a smaller number of factors, the fourth term in the right hand side of the equation (14) does not much change but the probability of the second term greatly increases,

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user-specifying-data/user-ID correspondence table 27 explained with reference to FIG. 16. The colluder ID calculating section 47 calculates a user ID in the following manner, unlike the colluder ID calculating section 46 shown in FIG. 10.

As shown in FIG. 21, the colluder ID calculating section 47 is comprised of a colluder ID candidate generating section 471, a colluder ID candidate discriminating section 472, and a colluder ID determining section 473. In the following, the processing procedure in the colluder ID calculating section 47 shown in FIG. 21 will be explained with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG. 22.

First, a process of the colluder ID candidate generating section 471 will now be described.

At first, k' -tuple of residues obtained by the component code decoding sections 42-1, 42-2, ..., 42- k' are inputted (step S41). Next, all the user IDs that have already been used are considered as j ($j=0$ to $n-1$), and $j=0$ is set firstly (step S42). Then, it is determined whether or not the currently set j exceeds a range of the user ID, namely $j > n-1$ or $j \leq n-1$ (step S43). If j exceeds the range of the user ID, the calculation of the colluder ID is completed.

On the other hand, if j does not exceed the range of the colluder ID, with respect to a user ID (j), the number x of i that satisfy a congruence $j \equiv r_i(\pm) \pmod{p_i}$

5 called the "number of satisfied congruencies". Then,
it is checked whether or not the congruence expression
satisfying number (x) is a predetermined threshold
value y or more (step S45). A larger threshold value
y can be set if small detection error is desired,

15 However, if no such determination is made, the
detection error cannot be set to ϵ or less unless y is
set to $k+z$ or more.

On the other hand, if x is smaller than the threshold value y , the process advances to step S49 to be described later. The colluder ID candidate thus generated is outputted from the colluder ID candidate generating section 471.

A process of the colluder ID candidate discriminating section 472 will now be described.

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with respect to a single value of j . In step S49, since the similar process is made with respect to the next j , j is incremented by one. Thereafter, the process returns to step S43 to repeat the similar process. Accordingly, the colluder ID candidate generating process shown in FIG. 18 is expected with respect to all the user ID and all j satisfying $x \geq y$ can be obtained as the colluder ID candidate.

Next, explanation will be made of discrimination processing in the step S47 shown in FIG. 22 for determining whether each of the colluder ID candidates generated as described above is a weak ID or non-weak ID, with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG. 23.

This discrimination processing is basically the same as the discrimination processing shown in FIG. 19 by the user ID candidate discriminating section 26 shown in FIG. 17 in the user ID assigning section 26 in the code concatenating section 11 shown in FIG. 16, except that the user ID candidate as the discrimination target is replaced with the colluder ID candidate.

That is, colluder ID candidates determined in the step S46 in FIG. 22 are sequentially inputted one after another (step S61), and the probability (detection error rate) at which these colluder ID candidates are erroneously detected as colluder IDs is estimated (step S62). Estimation of this detection error rate is carried out, for example, by defining the equations (9)

and (10) described previously and by calculating the evaluation value EEP of the equation (11) or (12), as an amount which substantially expresses the probability at which a given user ID(u) is erroneously detected as a colluder ID. Next, whether or not the detection error rate (e.g., the EEP of the equation (11) or (12)) estimated in the step S62 exceeds a predetermined threshold value is checked (step S63). If it exceeds the threshold value, the colluder ID candidate is determined as a weak ID (step S64). Otherwise, if the detection error probability is equal to or less than the threshold value, the colluder ID candidate is determined as a non-weak ID (step S65).

FIG. 24 shows colluder IDs detected with respect to actual colluder IDs, the numbers (x) of satisfied congruencies, and either a correct or incorrect detection result (1 denotes a correct detection and 0 denotes an incorrect detection), in case where parameters are set so as to satisfy $L=7.34 \times 10^6$, $c=32$, $EEF=0.000001$, $k=2$, $p_0=512$, $\ell=11$, $k'=208$, $n=2.63 \times 10^5$.

In case of this example, $k+\ell=13$ is given, and therefore, only ID=47824 is detected as a colluder ID among the actual IDs in the first embodiment. In contrast, according to the present embodiment, such an ID that is a non-weak ID and has a relatively large number x of satisfied congruencies is correctly detected as a colluder ID, among the actual colluder

IDs. In the example of FIG. 24, for example, if IDs of three or more figures are supposed to be non-weak IDs, those IDs that have a number x of satisfied congruencies of 10 or more among these non-weak IDs are all detected as colluder IDs.

FIG. 25 shows colluder IDs detected with respect to actual colluder IDs, the numbers (x) of satisfied congruencies, and either a correct or incorrect detection result (1 denotes a correct detection and 0 denotes an incorrect detection), in case where the parameters L , EEP , k , p_0 , ℓ , k' , and n are set to the same as those in FIG. 24 except for the parameter c which is set to $c=64$. Since the colluder number c is twice greater than that of FIG. 24, it is not possible to detect a colluder ID by the manner of the first embodiment. In contrast, in the example of FIG. 25, if non-weak IDs are assumed to be greater than 10,000 and the threshold y is said to be 6, those that have a number x of satisfied congruencies of 6 or more among these non-weak IDs are all detected as colluder IDs.

Thus, according to the present embodiment, the following advantages can be attained.

(1) The number of colluders can be specified with respect to a much larger number c of colluders.

In other words, if an equal maximum number of colluders are assumed, it is possible to realize an embedded code having a much shorter code length compared with that of

the first embodiment.

(2) A plurality of colluder IDs can be specified.

(3) Colluders can be specified even when noise (e.g., random noise) other than collusion attacks is applied to an embedded code.

The advantages (1) and (2) are just the same as described above. A supplementary explanation as follows will be added to the advantage (3).

For example, if random noise is added to an embedded code (watermark information) throughout the entire of a content, a code which outputs an erroneous residue may be generated when decoding a component code.

If the error rate caused by this random noise falls within a certain extent, correct residue pairs are overwhelmingly more than incorrect residue pairs.

Accordingly, correct colluder ID candidates have a greater number of satisfied congruencies than incorrect colluder ID candidates, so that the detection error rate of colluder IDs is small.

(Third Embodiment)

FIG. 26 shows the structure of the code generating section 11 according to the third embodiment of the present invention. In the code generating section 11 according to the present embodiment, the structure shown in FIG. 7 is added with a database referring section 28 and a non-weak ID database 29.

The non-weak ID database 29 stores non-weak IDs

among all user ID candidates. The non-weak IDs stored in this non-weak database 29 are obtained in a method similar to the discriminating method in the user ID candidate discriminating section 262 according to the
5 second embodiment, e.g., in a method in which either a weak ID or non-weak ID is discriminated by the algorithm explained with reference to FIG. 19 with respect to all user ID candidates.

When user specifying data is inputted, the
10 database referring section 28 assigns one non-weak ID stored in the non-weak ID database 29, as a user ID, corresponding to the use specifying data, and outputs the non-weak ID (user ID). The residue calculating sections 22-1 to 22-k' the component code generating
15 sections 24-1 to 24-k', and the code concatenating section 25 sequentially perform processing on the user ID, thereby to generate a code to be embedded, like the first and second embodiments.

Information indicating which non-weak ID is
20 assigned to which user specifying data by the database referring section 28 is stored together in the non-weak database 29. That is, with respect to those non-weak IDs that have already been assigned as user IDs to user specifying data among non-weak IDs stored in the non-
25 weak ID database 29, corresponding user specifying data items are stored, maintaining their correspondences to those non-weak IDs. In this manner, those non-weak IDs

that have already been assigned to any user specifying data are not assigned to user specifying data items inputted afterward.

Thus, according to the code generating section 11 of the present embodiment, non-weak IDs, i.e., those user IDs that can be erroneously detected as colluder IDs at a high possibility among all user IDs are previously obtained and are stored into the non-weak ID database 29. Referring to the non-weak ID database 29, user IDs are assigned to user specifying data. Therefore, the same assignment of user IDs as that of the second embodiment can be realized in a short time with a less processing amount.

FIG. 27 shows the structure of the embedded-code detecting section 14 according to the present embodiment. The embedded-code detecting section 14 according to the present embodiment is added with a non-weak database 29 and a database referring section 49 in place of the user-specifying-data/user-ID correspondence table 27 and the colluder specifying data generating section 48 shown in FIG. 20.

The non-weak database 29 is the same as that explained with reference to FIG. 26. Non-weak IDs and user specifying data items are stored, maintaining correspondences therebetween. When colluder ID candidates are inputted, such a non-weak ID among non-weak IDs stored in the non-weak ID database 29

that corresponds to any of colluder ID candidates is determined as a colluder ID by the database referring section 49. The user specifying data corresponding to the non-weak ID is read from the non-weak ID database 29 and is outputted as colluder specifying data.

According to the embedded-code detecting section 14 of the present embodiment, non-weak IDs, i.e., those user IDs that can be erroneously detected as colluder IDs at a high possibility among all user IDs are previously obtained and are stored into the non-weak ID database 29. Referring to the non-weak ID database 29, a colluder ID is calculated, and user specifying data corresponding to the colluder ID is calculated. Therefore, the same processing of calculating colluder IDs as that of the second embodiment can be realized in a short time with a less processing amount.

In this embodiment, the non-weak ID database 19 is implemented. However, the non-weak ID may be discriminated from the weak ID by using a circuit or a program. Particularly, if the colluder ID is known and the colluder can be specified by means other than the present invention, it is necessary only to exclude the weak IDs.

(Fourth Embodiment)

Next, explanation will be made of a watermark embedding unit and a watermark detecting unit, as the fourth embodiment, based on a c-secure code having a

shorter code length than that of the second embodiment, which can be realized under a certain condition.

FIG. 28 is a block diagram showing the structure of the code generating section according to the present embodiment. The code generating section is comprised of component code generating sections 61-1, 61-2, ..., 61-k' which are inputted with a user ID and generate component codes based on an equivalence class, and a code concatenating section 62 for concatenating those component codes into one code thereby to generate a code as watermark data to be embedded.

FIG. 29 shows the structure of one section 61-i among the component code generating sections 61-1, 61-2, ..., 61-k'. In the following, $Z/pZ = \{0, 1, 2, \dots, p-1\}$ is given. The component code generating sections 61-i is constructed by an inside- $(Z/pZ)^k$ corresponding point calculating section 611, an equivalence class element number calculating section 612, and a component code generating section 613.

The inside- $(Z/pZ)^k$ corresponding point calculating section 611 is inputted with a user ID and outputs a corresponding point within $(Z/pZ)^k$. Correspondence between a user ID(u) and a point $(u_0, u_1, u_2, \dots, u_{p-1})$ within $(Z/pZ)^k$ is given, for example, by $u = u_0 + u_1p + \dots + u_{k-1}p^{k-1}$. If there is an equivalence relationship R between factors of a set U, a set of all factors each of which is equivalent to

a given factor u is called an equivalent class of the factor u . A set of entire equivalence classes related to the equivalence relationship R of the set U is expressed as U/R and is called a equivalence class of U related to R . By a parallel transformation T between the factors of $(Z/pZ)^k$, the equivalence relationship R_T can be defined. Further, a equivalence class related to this equivalence relationship R_T can be defined.

Numbers from 0 to p^{k-1} (which are called equivalence class element numbers) can be assigned to elements which belong to one same equivalence class. The equivalence class element number calculating section 612 calculates the equivalence class element number and output it as a component ID. That is, in the present embodiment, the equivalence class element number calculating section 612 calculates the equivalence class element numbers, as a set of integral elements with respect to an inputted user ID. The component code generating section 613 generates a component code from the component ID calculated by the equivalence class element number calculating section 612.

FIG. 30 is a view showing an example of an equivalence class based on parallel transformation. This figure shows an example where $p=7$ and $k=2$ are given. It is apparent that the parallel transformations $(1,6)$ and $(3,4)$ define one same equivalence class

FIG. 31 is a view showing how an equivalence class is expressed when the grid of $p \times p$ shown in FIG. 30 is repeated cyclically. Such an equivalence class that is defined by an equivalence relationship based on parallel transformation and includes a grid part (0,0) can be found to be on a line having a certain inclination. FIG. 32 is a view showing an example where FIG. 30 is expanded to $k=3$. In a similar manner, an equivalence class can be defined by an equivalence relationship based on parallel transformation with respect to an arbitrary positive integer k .

Meanwhile, the number of elements of a set of
quotients (= the number of equivalence classes) is
 $p^k/p=p^{k-1}$. Therefore, if an order number is specified,
 p^{k-1} elements are specified. This order number is
20 coded as a component ID by means of a component code.

This method uses equivalence class numbers as

numbers that are assigned to equivalence classes relating to an equivalence relationship R_A . Numbers from 0 to p^{k-1} are assigned.

(Assigning Method 2)

5 This method uses numbers assigned to elements of an equivalence class. Numbers from 0 to $p-1$ are assigned.

10 Of the above two methods, the assigning method 2 is more preferable. If the assigning method 2 is adopted, the same discussion as made on the second embodiment can be developed, and therefore, the equation (6) described previously is given. That is, it is only necessary to adopt a code that satisfies both the equation (2) and equation (22) to be
15 described later. An example of this assigning method 2 will be cited below. In case of an equivalence class based on the parallel transformation $A_i=(a_{i,0}, a_{i,1}, \dots, a_{i,k-1})$, the next equation is assigned as a equivalence class element number (component ID) to
20 $u=(u_0, \dots, u_{k-1})$.

$$\sum_{j=0}^{k-1} u_j a_{i,j} \bmod p \quad (15)$$

25 FIG. 33 shows the structure of the code detection section in the watermark detecting unit according to the present embodiment. This code detecting section is comprised of a code division section 71, component code decoding sections 72-1, 72-2, \dots , 72-k', and a colluder

By an embedded-code extracting section not shown, watermark information (code to be embedded) is extracted from an inputted content (code-embedded content) as a detection target. The code to be embedded, as the extracted watermark information, is divided into component codes by the code division section 71. Thereafter, the component codes are decoded by the component code decoding sections 72-1, 72-2, ..., 72-k' based on equivalence class, thereby generating pairs of equivalence class element numbers corresponding to a user ID. From each pair of equivalence class element numbers thus generated, a colluder ID is calculated by the colluder ID calculating section 73, so that colluders are specified.

Like the first and second embodiments, the structure may be arranged as follows. A user ID is obtained from one of each pair of equivalence class element numbers by the user ID calculating section. From each pair of equivalence class element numbers, presence or absence of a collusion is determined. With respect to results of the collusion discriminating section, a logical sum is obtained by the collusion discriminating OR section. Whether or not a collusion has existed is determined finally. If it is determined that a collusion exists, the colluder ID calculating

section 73 calculates a colluder ID.

FIG. 34 shows the structure of one section (72-i) of the component code generating sections 72-1, 72-2, ..., 72-k'. The component code decoding section 72-i based on equivalence class is based on the detection algorithm 3 which permits a random error described later. The component code generating sections 72-1 is comprised of a block division section 720, "1"-bit calculating sections 721, ">t₀"-discriminating sections 722, "d-t₀"-discriminating sections 723, a minimum position selecting section 724, and a maximum position selecting section 725.

The block division section 720 divides an inputted component code into restricted blocks and outputs division results to the "1"-bit calculating sections 721, respectively. One "1"-bit calculating section 721 calculates the number of bits expressing "1" and outputs the calculated value to both of the ">t₀"-discriminating section 722 and the "d-t₀"-discriminating section 723.

The ">t₀"-discriminating section 722 determines whether or not the input is greater than a first threshold value t₀. The section 722 outputs 1 if true or 0 if false. The "d-t₀"-discriminating section 723 determines whether or not the input is smaller than a second threshold value d-t₀. The section 723 outputs 1 if true or 0 if false.

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(Method 2)

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The present embodiment adopts the method 2. Suppose that extracted codes to be embedded are added with errors at random probabilities. Errors are

permitted by using the detection algorithm 3 which is obtained by modifying the algorithm 1 described previously in the section embodiment.

(Detection Algorithm 3)

- 5 (1) Input a detected code $x \in \{0,1\}^l$. Suppose now that $l=(n-1)d$ is given.
- (2) Execute the following from $s=0$ to $n-2$.
- (2-1) Stop if $\text{weight}(x|_{B_s}) > t_0$ is satisfied.
- (3) Execute the following from $t=n-1$ to s .
- 10 (3-1) Interrupt if $\text{weight}(x|_{B_{t-1}}) < d-t_0$ is satisfied.
- (4) Output s and t .

In this algorithm, t_0 is a parameter indicating permissiveness of the detection algorithm with respect to an error.

- 15 Explained next will be the meaning of adding a new parameter as a threshold value for determining that an alteration has been made on an embedded code by a collusion.

- 20 If a random error occurs due to any other reason than collusions with respect to such a block among embedded codes that has not been altered by a collusion, the probability at which inversion of t_0+1 bits or more occurs can be obtained by the next equation.

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$$\varepsilon_1 = \sum_{i=t_0+1}^d C_i (1-\varepsilon_0)^{d-i} \varepsilon_0^i < e^{-\frac{(t_0-d\varepsilon_0)^2}{d}} \quad (16)$$

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(17)

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$$\varepsilon_3 = 1 - (1 - \varepsilon_1)^{n-1} (1 - \varepsilon_2)^2 < (n-1) \varepsilon_1 + 2 \varepsilon_2.$$

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The equivalence class element selecting section 81

selects one from each of k' pairs of equivalence class element numbers and outputs it to the consistency detecting section 82. When the section 81 receives a request for a next candidate from the consistency
5 detecting section 82, the section 81 selects a new set of equivalence class element numbers.

The consistency detecting section 82 selects a set of $(k+l)$ elements from a set of k' elements and checks whether or not the set of equivalence class element
10 numbers is truly consistent. This check is carried out by supplying the candidate ID calculating section 83 with k equivalence class element numbers among $(k+l)$ numbers and by determining whether or not a returned candidate ID contradicts to the remaining equivalence
15 class element numbers. If a contradiction is determined with respect to none of all the remaining equivalence class numbers, this candidate ID is outputted as a colluder ID. Otherwise, a next candidate is requested to the consistency detecting
20 section 82.

Explanation will now be made of a method for reconstructing a colluder ID from k equivalence class element numbers in the candidate ID calculating section 83 shown in FIG. 36. For example, if equivalence class
25 element numbers of r_0, \dots, r_{k-1} are given to k parallel transformations $A_{i(0)}, \dots, A_{i(k-1)}$, the following simultaneous congruent equation exists.

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(18)

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(19)

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(20)

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a set of quotients U/R_A relating to an equivalence relationship R_A of $U=(Z/pZ)^k$. Individual elements of this set of quotients are called an equivalence class and are a set of elements that are identified with each other. By providing elements contained in all equivalence classes with order numbers, one element can be selected from each equivalence class by specifying a certain number.

If k' ($k \geq k$) parallel transformations $A_0, \dots, A_{k'-1}$ are prepared, quotient sets $Q_i = U/R_{A_i}$ ($i=0, \dots, k'-1$) are defined respectively for the parallel transformations. The order numbers as described above are respectively defined for the quotient sets.

Next, the following conditions are supposed in order to construct a quotient set which can uniquely specify a user by specifying order numbers respectively for arbitrary k quotient sets among the k' quotient sets.

(Condition 1)

Suppose that the quotient sets have an equal size. Suppose that $\gcd(a_{i,m}, p) = 1$ or $a_{i,m} = 0$ are satisfied with respect to all $a_{i,m}$ ($m=0, \dots, k-1$) in all $A_i = (a_{i,0}, \dots, a_{i,k-1})$ ($i=0, \dots, k'-1$). Hence, the minimum positive integer j which satisfies $jA_i = (0 \bmod p, \dots, 0 \bmod p)$ is p .

(Condition 2)

There exists no positive integer $j < p, j' < p$ which

satisfies $jA_i = j'A_i'$ with respect to two parallel transformations A_i, A_i' .

5 If p is a prime number, the number of parallel transformations that satisfies the conditions described above can be counted as follows.

At first, the number of cases that the value of the component of each parallel transformation and p are prime to each other is expressed by $\phi(p) = p-1$ from the condition 1. Here, ϕ is an Euler function.

10 A case of 0 is added thereto. Then, the number of cases of values which each component can take is p . Accordingly, the number of cases that are permitted as parallel transformations is (p^k-1) . In this equation, -1 is added because $(0, 0, \dots, 0)$ is excluded. Among

15 them, however, each value has those $(p-1)$ values that are integral multiples (1 time, 2 times, \dots , $(p-1)$ times) of itself. Therefore, $(p^k-1)/(p-1)$ is the number of those parallel transformations that are independent as parallel transformations which

20 respectively define different quotient sets.

With respect to the condition 2, suppose that given two parallel transformations A_i, A_i' do not the limitations of the condition 2. That is, suppose that $jA_i = j'A_i'$ is satisfied with respect to the positive

25 integer $j < p$, $j' < p$. If p are prime numbers, it means that they can be expressed as multiples of each other. Accordingly, the counted independent parallel

003060"59595959

transformations with respect to the condition 1 directly satisfy the condition 2.

The sets of parallel transformations can be constructed as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
 A_1 &= (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1), \\
 A_2 &= (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1, 0), \\
 &\vdots \\
 A_{1+p} &= (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1, p-1), \\
 A_{1+p+1} &= (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1, 0, 0), \\
 &\vdots \\
 A_{1+p+p^2} &= (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1, p-1, p-1), \\
 &\vdots \\
 A_{1+p+p^2+\dots+p^{k-2}+1} &= (1, 0, \dots, 0), \\
 &\vdots \\
 A_{1+p+p^2+\dots+p^{k-1}} &= (1, p-1, \dots, p-1).
 \end{aligned} \tag{21}$$

With respect to the case where p is not a prime number, the same construction as above can be achieved by selecting parallel transformations so as to satisfy the conditions 1 and 2.

By constructing quotient sets by parallel transformations as described above and by defining order numbers for elements of equivalence class of each quotient set, it is possible to construct a code similar to that of the case of the code based on the Chinese remainder theorem. In order that this code is a c -secure code with ε -error, the following condition must be satisfied in addition to the theorem 2.

$$k' = \frac{c}{2}(k+1) \leq \frac{p^k - 1}{p - 1} \tag{22}$$

In this case, all factors are p having an equal size. Therefore, $p_{ave} = p$ is given.

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FIG. 37 shows the structure of the watermark embedding unit according to the present embodiment. This watermark embedding unit is comprised of a simplex

The simplex code is a code which has a cross-correlation of $-1/(n-1)$ between codewords where the code length is $n-1$ and the number of codewords is n . This code can be constructed on the basis of a

15 The simplex code generating section 91 generates
codewords of this kind of simplex code. The simplex
code generating section 91 may be a storage which
contains previously generated codewords. The codeword
selecting section 92 assigns order numbers to generated
20 simplex codes and selects and outputs codewords
corresponding to a given user ID. The parts of the
simplex code generating section 91 and the codeword
selecting section 92 may be arranged such that, after
a user ID is inputted, codewords of a simplex code
25 corresponding the user ID are generated and outputted.

The watermark embedding section 93 embeds
codewords received from the codeword selecting part 92,

FIG. 39 shows the structure of the watermark
5 embedding unit according to the present embodiment
corresponding to the watermark embedding unit shown in
FIG. 37. This watermark embedding unit is comprised
of a simplex code generating section 101, a codeword
selecting section 102, a correlation calculating
10 section 103, and a correlation discriminating section
104. The simplex code generating section 101 and the
codeword selecting section 102 are the same as those of
the watermark embedding unit explained with reference
to FIG. 37. Therefore, explanation thereof will be
15 omitted.

Thus, in the watermark embedding/detecting unit

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section 113 are basically the same as those of the watermark embedding unit shown in FIG. 39.

The user ID generating section 114 generates all user IDs that are previously registered. The codeword selecting section 112 selects codewords of simplex codes corresponding to all the user IDs, and correlation values between these codewords and a code-embedded content not shown are calculated by the correlation calculating sections 113.

The correlation vector norm calculating section 115 regards the correlation values calculated with respect to all the user IDs, as vectors, and calculates a norm thereof. The correlation vector norm is a sum of all the correlation values.

The watermark discriminating section 116 determines whether or not watermark information has been embedded, for example, depending on whether or not the norm exceeds a certain threshold value. If it is determined that watermark information has been embedded as a result of this determination, the colluder discriminating section 117 specifies the user who has a user ID which shows the greatest value among the correlation vectors, as a colluder.

In addition to a method of this kind, the colluder specifying section 117 can obtain which component unit among component units of the (n-1)-dimensional unit has the barycenter through which a correlation vector

008060"59585960

In the fifth to sixth embodiments, a simplex code
5 generated by the simplex code generating section 121
may be rotated randomly by means of a section for
randomly rotating coordinates 122, thereby to attain
codewords, if Gaussian noise of $N(0,1)$ is adopted as
the pseudo random number system used as watermark
0 information.

Additional advantages and modifications will
25 readily occur to those skilled in the art. Therefore,
the invention in its broader aspects is not limited to
the specific details and representative embodiments

[illegible]